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The University of Chicago is a place that prides itself on contrari-
anism: think the unconventional; imagine the impossible; take the
game of playing devil's advocate to new heights. This is therefore the
perfect place to take a fresh look at an issue on which one has long
had firm views. After years of arguing that international antitrust rules
are either utterly impractical or downright dangerous, I propose to
don another hat and to imagine what the rules of a new global anti-
trust regime ought to be.
There are a number of good reasons for doing this. First, antitrust
or competition law is with us to stay at the global level: proselytizing
on the part of the United States,3 coupled with the self-interest that
has led countless nations to adopt or strengthen market-based econo-
mies in the last fifteen years, has resulted in a world in which more than
one hundred countries now have national antitrust laws. Those laws, to
the extent that they regulate the actions of firms operating on an in-
ternational scale, have just as much potential for conflict as banking
laws, tax laws, securities laws, tort laws, or any other body of law one
can name. Second, the topic is timely. On June 14, 2004, the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in E Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd v Em-
pagran S.A. , which addressed the extent to which the Sherman Act
reaches foreign-based anticompetitive conduct that causes only for-
eign injury. In the course of its discussion, the Court expressed some
skepticism about the extent to which the antitrust laws of the various
nations have really converged, and it observed that thinking about
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1992 U Chi Legal F 277, 287-88 (recounting an ABA study that disclaimed the desirability of a
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2 See, for example, Diane P. Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The
Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 Chi J Intl L 391,404-07 (2002) (arguing that the development of interna-
tional antitrust law should proceed slowly).
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1990 256-68 (Cambridge 1992) (describing how the U.S. government pressured Britain to adopt
antitrust legislation after the Second World War).
4 124 S Ct 2359 (2004) (finding that federal antitrust laws did not apply when price-fixing
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appropriate remedies still differs "dramatically."' Third, even though
competition law may not be on the front burner for the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the topic of competition policy has not disap-
peared either. Rather than stay on the sidelines while global rules are
developed--either openly in the WTO, subtly through the independ-
ent International Competition Network,6 or elsewhere -it is desirable
to engage the debate more directly.
Most efforts that have been undertaken in this respect have paid
close attention to political realities. They ask which solutions are prac-
tical and which stand a chance of adoption. For WTO negotiators and
government officials, this approach has obvious merit. But there is
also a place for a more detached and academic inquiry. This Essay
takes a look at the kind of rules that would be best for the system,
based purely on their intrinsic soundness.
Part I examines the ideal scope for international antitrust rules.
Part II focuses on the particular substantive and procedural provisions
that an international antitrust code should have. Finally, Part III con-
cludes by pointing out that any sound code ought to be restricted to
the bare essentials of competition laws and must commit each signa-
tory country to sound, economically based rules.
I. SCOPE OF PROPOSED RULES
Any set of international competition rules would logically treat
the issue of coverage. There is a need to define which business ar-
rangements, transactions, or agreements would be governed by the
international regime, and which would remain under purely domestic
rules. Logically, this requires definitions and a description of the scope
of the agreement.
5 Id at 2368 ("[Elven where nations agree about primary conduct, say price-fixing, they
disagree dramatically about appropriate remedies.").
6 The International Competition Network (ICN) is a voluntary international body whose
membership is open to any national or multinational competition authority entrusted with
the enforcement of antitrust laws. Although the ICN is oriented toward convergence, it is with-
out rulemaking authority; rather, best practices are achieved through unilateral, bilateral, or
multilateral arrangements. See International Competition Network, About the ICN, online at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/aboutus~html (visited Nov 22,2004).
7 See, for example, Wood, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 278 (cited in note 1) (calling a "suprana-
tional procedural or substantive regime ... an impossible dream"); International Competition
Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Anti-
trust, Final Report ch 5 at 264-69 (2000), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm
(visited Nov 22, 2004) (analyzing U.S. trade and competition policy and making policy recom-
mendations with an eye to possible reactions from U.S. industry, U.S. labor, and other countries);
Eleanor M. Fox, InternationalAntitrust and the Doha, 43 Va J Intl L 911,927 (2003) (recognizing
that a "strong form" global antitrust regime is "neither practical nor acceptable to the world").
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In crafting any such provision, the drafters would not be operat-
ing on a blank slate. Models exist in other areas of the law for drawing
the line between international and domestic rules. Two such models
can be found in the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards' (New York Conven-
tion), adopted in the United States in chapter 2 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act,' and in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods' ° (CISG), which is also in force in the
United States." In both of these areas, an international regime sits side
by side with a domestic regime covering the same subject matter.
The New York Convention sets forth the following area of appli-
cability in Article 1.1:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the
State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether
physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not consid-
ered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and
enforcement are sought."
It thus offers a model for a definition of what it takes for something to
be "foreign" rather than domestic-a line that would be just as impor-
tant to draw in any document addressed solely to international com-
petition issues.
The CISG is another multilateral treaty designed to treat the spe-
cial problems of international commerce. When it applies, it normally
supplants state law rather than federal law, but from the international
standpoint that difference is unimportant. The CISG addresses the
scope of its application in Article 1(1), where it says:
This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between
parties whose places of business are in different States: (a) when
the States are Contracting States; or (b) when the rules of private
international law lead to the application of the law of a Contract-
ing State."
8 21 UST 2517,330 UN Treaty Ser 3 (1958).
9 Pub L No 91-368,84 Stat 692 (1970), codified at 9 USC § 201 et seq (2000).
10 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, reprinted
in 19 Intl Legal Matters 668,671 (1980) (suggesting an alternative to the New York Convention).
11 U.S. Ratification of 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 52 Fed Reg 6262 (1987).
12 New York Convention, 330 UN Treaty Ser at 38 (cited in note 8).
13 CISG Art 1(1), reprinted in 19 Intl Legal Matters at 672 (cited in note 10).
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This model may be more useful than that of the New York Conven-
tion, because it applies to ongoing business relationships rather than
to a single, definable document such as an arbitral award.
Before leaving this topic, it is important finally to take account of
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act14 (FFAIA), which ad-
dresses the question of when the U.S. antitrust laws reach transactions
with some international element-that is, those that are somehow "in
foreign commerce." Although the problem of the international reach
of the antitrust laws addressed by the FTAIA is not quite the same as
the one that this Essay addresses, the FTAIA itself does not apply
unless the case involves foreign commerce. It therefore requires one
to draw a distinction between international and domestic cases, as the
following language demonstrates:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with
foreign nations unless- (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect [on domestic trade or com-
merce], or on import trade or import commerce with foreign na-
tions; or [on export commerce of a U.S. exporter]; and (2) such
effect gives rise to [an antitrust claim].,5
Note, however, that this statute has nothing to say about cases involv-
ing import commerce. Any international set of antitrust rules would
presumably apply both to import cases and to export cases from signa-
tory countries.
II. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL RULES
Once coverage is established, the next step is to craft the rules or
principles themselves. In one way or another, efforts to create such
rules have been underway for nearly sixty years." But these efforts
became more energetic in the early 1990s, when a group of scholars
operating under the auspices of the Max Planck Institute offered a
full-blown draft code for general discussion." Reactions to that effort
were mixed." More recently, a formal working group within the WTO
14 15 USC § 6a (2000).
15 Id.
16 See Wood, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 281 (cited in note 1).
17 See International Antitrust Code Working Group, Draft International Antitrust Code as
a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement (July 10, 1993), reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade
Reg Rep (BNA) S-1, No 1628 (Special Supp Aug 19,1993).
18 For a negative discussion of this effort, see Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International
Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 Minn J Global Trade 1, 4-5
(1997) (arguing that the draft code identifies prohibited behavior through "conceptual rather
than economic approaches" and is too vague). For the views of one of the drafters, see Ernst-
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has tried to reach consensus on draft rules suitable for WTO adoption,
somehow, and somewhere. '9 The results of the group's efforts appear
in the Doha Ministerial Declaration 25, which proposes that com-




* Prohibition of hard-core cartels
* Modalities for voluntary cooperation
* Institutional building in developing countries
The failure of the 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun, which might
have added these issues to the active agenda of that organization, has
left this project in doubt.2' But, to borrow a phrase, it may be gone
temporarily but it has not been forgotten. It will return because
enough people are convinced of the soundness of the proposition that
a global free trade regime needs complementary global competition
rules so that free trade will not be undermined by private restraints
that isolate national markets.22
Returning to the Doha list, however, three distinct topics can be
identified:
" Background rules
* Substantive antitrust rules
* Procedural mechanisms
Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments and for Private Business: A
"Trade Law Approach"for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 Chi Kent L Rev
545,565-74 (1996).
19 See World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration 23-25, VTO Doc
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001), online at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist e/min0le/
mindecl e.htm (visited Nov 22,2004) (calling for further work on the topic of competition policy
to be undertaken by the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition
Policy).
20 Id.
21 See Paul Blustein, Walkout Shadows Free Trade's Future; WTO Meeting, Stymied by
Accusations, Seen as Sign of Globalization's Limits, Wash Post A13 (Sept 16, 2003) (blaming
disagreements on antitrust laws and cross-border investment, in addition to agricultural policy,
for the walkout that ended the global trade negotiations).
22 See, for example, Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 Berkeley J
Intl L 355,357 (2004) (arguing that international trade can "distort policy decisions in antitrust").
One can certainly debate whether that idea-which is also said to underlie the commitment of
the European Union to strong competition rules-is sound or not, but it remains true that much
of the political force behind global competition rules rests on this assumption.
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Before addressing the question of whether each and every Doha topic
ought to be reflected in global competition rules, it is useful to begin
by taking a look at these three points.
A. Background Rules
Background rules sound like an innocuous idea, but it is still nec-
essary to ask whether there are any such rules that are typically not
found in the 100-odd domestic antitrust laws that exist in the world
that are good candidates for an international antitrust agreement. One
perennial candidate for such a rule is the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion, well known to students of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the WTO. In that setting, the word nondiscrimina-
tion calls to mind two related rules: the most-favored-nation commit-
ment, which obliges members not to pick and choose among their fel-
low signatories, but instead to treat all of them alike;"- and the national
treatment commitment, which obliges members to treat persons from
fellow members just as well as they treat their own nationals.4 At least
within the U.S. antitrust laws, one does not find a similar rule forbid-
ding companies from engaging in nationality-based discrimination. If
Megafirm decides, on its own, to purchase only from suppliers in the
United States, nothing in the antitrust laws will prevent it from doing
so. On the other hand, when the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) takes action, those agencies do not
discriminate on the basis of the nationality of the targeted person or
company unless some other law expressly calls for some form of dif-
ferential treatment."
A realist would argue that it is worth including a nondiscrimina-
tion principle for the simple reason that many countries either explic-
itly or implicitly still reserve the right to prefer their domestic indus-
tries." On the whole, these are developing countries, not countries like
the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. The WTO discussions themselves have acknowledged
that any agreement concluded under the WTO's auspices would need
23 See GATT, Art I, reprinted in John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan 0. Sykes, Jr.,
2002 Documents Supplement to Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 15, 17-18
(West 4th ed 2002) (setting out the obligations of the most-favored-nation commitment).
24 GATT, Art III at 20-21 (cited in note 23) (setting out the national treatment commitment).
25 Some such laws do still exist, although their numbers are decreasing. See, for example, 47
USC § 310 (2000) (restricting broadcast licenses on the basis of nationality). See generally Chris-
topher F. Corr, A Survey of United States Controls on Foreign Investment and Operations: How
Much Is Enough?, 9 Am U J Intl L & Policy 417 (1994).
26 See Eleanor M. Fox, Global Markets; National Law, and the Regulation of Business: A
View from the Top, 75 St John's L Rev 383,392 (2001).
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to provide for special treatment for developing countries." Whether
this is a good idea or a bad idea is obviously debatable. What is not
debatable, however, is the question of whether it is consistent with a
robust nondiscrimination principle: it is not.
My suggestion would be to leave out of the international antitrust
code any rules that are not particular to antitrust. This would include
not only the nondiscrimination norm, which is broadly applicable to
every area touched by the WTO, but also the call for "transparency" of
laws, regulations, and official decisions. The term transparency is fre-
quently used in international circles. It means, roughly, that all laws,
regulations, and administrative decisions should be publicly available;
agencies should explain the reasons behind their actions; and the lim-
its on administrative discretion should be testable and publicly de-
fined. As with nondiscrimination, all of those are good things in prin-
ciple, but the need for them is certainly not confined to antitrust. Nor
is the call for procedural fairness, or for a noncorrupt and independentjudiciary, or for access to legal services. In the interest of simplicity, all
those topics can and should be addressed elsewhere.
B. Content of Agreement
The heart of any agreement is obviously the substantive antitrust
rules it contains. Logically, one might start with the key definitions,
move on to rules of conduct, and end with any exceptions that ought
to be recognized.
1. Definitions.
The number of terms that require definition is surprisingly small,
and the number of key principles that an agreement would need to
reflect is even smaller.
Here are my candidates for terms that usefully could be defined
in this type of agreement. As this Symposium makes clear, reasonable
people can disagree on the meaning of each term, but for present pur-poses the assumption is that common ground can be reached at least
within the United States, and with any luck, globally. Rather than at-
tempt that definitional exercise here, this Essay merely lists the terms
for which a common understanding would be important:
* Acquisition
* Cartel
27 See World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration 44 (cited in note 19)
(agreeing to review and strengthen "all special and differential treatment provisions").
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* Refusal to deal
* Resale price maintenance
" Tying arrangements
" Vertical restraints
Once these terms are defined, the stage is set for a general statement
of purpose. The greatest value in such a statement is in its ability to
focus both enforcers of the law (public or private) and judicial tribu-
nals on what is relevant.
2. Purpose.
Many foreign laws contain broad statements of purpose that (lit-
erally construed) appear to place the entire weight of economic suc-
cess, social equity, and international status on the back of the competi-
tion law." Perhaps at one time the U.S. antitrust laws also carried this
burden. But for the last thirty years or so, there has been a broad con-
sensus in the United States that antitrust is the body of law targeted at
business practices that harm economic welfare -practices that lead to
overcharges, underpayments, or anticompetitive exclusion from mar-
kets that will in turn lead to higher prices, lower quality, less innova-
tion, or other undesirable results. The model antitrust code should
state that this is the sole purpose of competition law. If other objec-
tives such as promoting local employment, preserving small business,
or ensuring fair business practices were included, the law would lose
important predictability, and it would be quite difficult to reconcile
these objectives at the international level. With respect to a side de-
bate that has been going on for many years-namely, whether the
28 See Wood, 3 Chi J Intl L at 393-94 (cited in note 2) (showing that different countries
have different goals for their competition laws).
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"welfare" to be protected is only consumer welfare, or whether it
ought to be viewed as total welfare, there is no reason not to adopt a
total welfare standard, as long as that standard is understood to in-
clude a high degree of skepticism for business claims that higher
prices will "really" help consumers in the end.29
3. Substantive rules.
Now, for the central prohibitions. Only three broad situations
must be addressed: first, concerted practices that do not lead to per-
manent integration; second, single-firm conduct; and finally, mergers
and acquisitions (that is, agreements permanently to unite all or part
of two or more firms or their assets). For historical reasons, the U.S.
antitrust laws only roughly reflect these three subjects. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act refers redundantly to "contracts, combinations, and con-
spiracies" in restraint of trade;-" § 2 covers not only single-firm mo-
nopolization and attempts to monopolize, but also "conspiracy" to
monopolize;" and § 2 and § 3 of the Clayton Act also cover part of the
"concerted action" ground." Perhaps the Antitrust Modernization
Commission, established under authority recently granted by Con-
gress,3  will be willing to recommend radical restructuring of the U.S.
laws in this area, to eliminate redundancies that currently exist be-
tween the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act, and even to look again
at the triply redundant public enforcement structure that empowers
two different federal agencies as well as all of the state attorneys gen-
eral. Others in the past have taken on this task, and it has proven ex-
ceptionally difficult. Even if the Commission chooses to recommend
improvements that do not require an extensive legislative overhaul,
however, that does not mean that even the United States would want
an international document to replicate the internal structure of U.S.
law.
Instead, the international prohibitions ought to be divided into
the three broad groups defined here: concerted action, single-firm be-
havior, and mergers and acquisitions. Within the concerted action
group, one can identify three distinct sets of issues: those involving
horizontal competitors (or producers of substitute goods or services),
those involving vertical arrangements (or complementary products or
29 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 23-28 (Chicago 2d ed 2001). See also Oliver Wil-
liamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am Econ Rev 18 (1968).
30 15 USC § 1 (2000).
31 15 USC § 2 (2000).
32 15 USC §§ 13-14 (2000).
33 See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub L No
107-273, 116 Stat 1758, 1856 (2002), codified at 15 USC § 1 note.
2005]
The University of Chicago Law Review
services), and those involving licenses of intellectual property. Only
the first could involve a cartel, and thus only the first would justify
what is now called a "per se" prohibitionY This kind of agreement
would be an opportunity to avoid that phrase, however, which might
help avoid misunderstandings.
a) Horizontal restraints. If a cartel (as defined in the agree-
ment) is found,35 then illegality should result whether or not its mem-
bers collectively possess market power. Here there is a need to decide
whether to prohibit the agreement alone, or only those agreements
that are implemented somehow, through actual price-fixing, bid-
rigging, market divisions, or other anticompetitive acts. In keeping
with U.S. law on the subject," it would be best to prohibit the agree-
ment itself, recognizing that proof of the agreement will often involve
proof of the overt acts.
For all the reasons so richly illustrated by U.S. antitrust history on
the subject of oligopoly," it is not worth trying to bring within this
code concerted practices that fall short of agreement. If one were to
do anything useful in this area, it would be to show how certain kinds
of economic evidence give rise to a plausible inference of intent to act
in a coordinated fashion interdependently. Beyond that, any effort to
reach oligopoly directly runs too great a risk of turning into a theory
against shared monopoly or collective dominance (as it is called in
Europe). Those theories were singularly unsuccessful in the United
States because they straddled the rules governing collective and indi-
vidual behavior and risked an intrusive, public utility-style regulation
of single-firm conduct.
As for noncartel horizontal concerted practices, the rule can be as
simple as the one stated in Valley Liquors, Inc v Renfield Importers,
Ltd' more than twenty years ago by Judge Posner: if the firms collec-
34 See Northern Pacific Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958) ("[T]here are cer-
tain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal with-
out elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their
use.").
35 Finding a cartel would involve the familiar characterization process we know from
Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc, 441 US 1, 8 (1979).
36 See Summit Health, Ltd v Pinhas, 500 US 322, 330 (1990) ("[Tlhe essence of any viola-
tion of [the Sherman Act] is the illegal agreement itself.").
37 See Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993) (hold-
ing that oligopolistic price coordination need not violate antitrust laws). See also William E.
Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a
Tool for Deconcentration, 74 Iowa L Rev 1105, 1140-44 (1989) (arguing that antitrust enforce-
ment is justified by political and social, if not economic, concerns); Lee Goldman, Oligopoly
Policy and the Ethyl Corp. Case, 65 Or L Rev 73,73 (1986) ("[Oligopoly pricing do[es] not have
to be the result of actual agreement.").
38 678 F2d 742 (7th Cir 1982).
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tively have market power, and they are taking actions that will harm
economic welfare, as we have defined it, then they have violated the
law. Embedded in this test is the idea that some practices will indeed
harm welfare, while others will be either neutral or positively procom-
petitive (usually because they either lead to efficiencies or they have
some reasonable prospect of doing so). This is the best way to take
efficiencies into account, as part of the original understanding of the
practice, rather than by adopting an efficiencies defense that will ex-
cuse otherwise anticompetitive behavior. The prohibited practices
would include both practices that harm consumers or suppliers of the
group and practices that are unlawfully exclusionary (another defined
term, by hypothesis).
It should not be necessary to have a separate section addressing
joint ventures, although it might be helpful to note that joint ventures
are a subset of the broad area of competitor collaborations (an idea
already reflected in the United States in government guidelines for
collaborations among competitors). ° If the term "exclusionary prac-
tice" has already been defined adequately, it should be equally unnec-
essary to identify separately things like tying arrangements or group
refusals to deal.
b) Vertical restraints. With respect to vertical restraints, U.S.
law sometimes appears to have a stricter standard for inferring
agreement than it uses for cartels or other horizontal agreements," but
sometimes it does not. In any case, the party seeking to show an
agreement must show conduct inconsistent with the hypothesis of in-
dependent action, as Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp42 and
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp3 make clear for
vertical arrangements and horizontal arrangements respectively. There
does not seem to be anything so extraordinary about vertical agree-
ments in the international context that would require special treat-
ment in the global code. Whether or not U.S. law ultimately retains the
39 See id at 745 (holding that market power and consumer harm are necessary to finding
an antitrust violation).
40 See Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines
for Collaborations Among Competitors (2000), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/
ftcdojguidelines.pdf (visited Nov 22, 2004).
41 See Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 US 332, 348 n 18 (1982)
("[Hiorizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints.").
42 465 US 752, 764 (1984) (noting that "something more than evidence of complaints is
needed").
43 475 US 574,588 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs "must show that the inference of conspir-
acy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action
that could not have harmed [the plaintiffs]").
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Dr. Miles rule domestically," the better part of valor internationally is
to throw in the towel and to create a uniform, rule-of-reason-based
rule of liability for vertical restraints. It is hard enough to figure out
price or price levels within a single market; when one introduces the
complexities of international pricing, currency fluctuations, difficulties
of monitoring foreign dealers, and the like, the game is not worth the
candle.
This move may be exceedingly unpopular with members of the
trade community who have long urged an international antitrust code.
Their agenda has been to secure access to foreign markets for U.S.
companies, and they are convinced that vertical restraints in general,
and vertical price restraints in particular, have been used to exclude
American companies. Exclusive dealing arrangements that exist on a
countrywide basis, such as was allegedly the case in Japan in industries
like flat glass and autos, can exclude foreign companies just as effec-
tively as tariffs by foreclosing access to available distribution outlets.
To take a U.S.-based approach on vertical restraints, and to adopt a
rule under which such restraints will be condemned in international
transactions only upon affirmative proof of an anticompetitive effect,
will disappoint those whose focus is on market access. Indeed, many of
them have urged that in international transactions, individual firms
should be required to deal with suppliers and customers on a basis
that does not discriminate on the ground of nationality. Such a rule
would be in serious tension with the Colgate doctrine.' Obviously, the
United States has other laws that address nationality-based discrimi-
nation,"' and the fact that the antitrust laws might not contain such a
rule says nothing about the way other laws might operate.
c) Single-firm market power. The initial question for this topic
is what to call it. In the United States, § 2 of the Sherman Act speaks
of monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to mo-
nopolize. In many other countries, the term "monopoly" appears no-
where in the law, and instead single-firm market power is addressed
44 See Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373,408 (1911) (establish-
ing a rule of per se illegality for vertical price-fixing arrangements, also known as minimum
resale price maintenance). But see Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U Chi L Rev 6 (1981); Posner, Antitrust Law at 182-83
(cited in note 29) (advocating per se legality).
45 See United States v Colgate & Co, 250 US 300, 307 (1919) ("In the absence of any pur-
pose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized
right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.").
46 See, for example, 42 USC § 1981 (2000) (banning nationality-based discrimination in
employment).
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under the rubric of abuse of a dominant position.7 Numerous impor-
tant questions must be answered, including where to place the thresh-
old level of power; how to administer a rule of legality that uses a slid-
ing scale of market power, if there is to be one; and how to distinguish
between, on the one hand, legitimate efforts to compete that may be
undertaken even by a monopolist or dominant firm and, on the other
hand, illegitimate efforts to secure or entrench market power.
d) Mergers and acquisitions. In this area, it would be hard to
improve on the horizontal merger guidelines in place since 1992 in the
United States." The international agreement should codify the "sig-
nificant lessening of competition" test,9 rather than the (now modi-
fied) European dominance test.'O Moreover, the guidelines usefully
identify two different types of competitive harm that might result
from a merger or acquisition: harms from coordinated behavior by the
remaining firms in the market, and harms from the unilateral action of
the merged firm.5 The two-year time period used as a rule of thumb in
the guidelines for predictions of likely competitive harm is also realis-
tic: not many people have a crystal ball that will enable them to see
likely competitive harms five or ten years in the future. In one respect,
however, the U.S. system does not offer the best model because it
never definitively approves a merger. The international agreement
should use something like the European system of ex ante approvals,
under which a transaction receives definitive clearance at the end of
the specified review period, rather than something like the U.S. sys-
tem, under which the responsible agency merely refrains from suing at
the end of the review period. Under the U.S. system, there is always a
risk that another party may sue to challenge the merger5 or that any
plaintiff will challenge a merger or acquisition many years after its
47 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, 298 UN Treaty Ser 11, 48 (1957)
(prohibiting any action to "take improper advantage of a dominant position in the [market]").
48 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 57 Fed Reg 41552.
49 See Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co v United States, 361 US 173,188 (1959) ("[T]he
important thing is not whether there is possibility of competition, but whether there is probabil-
ity of existing or potential competition being diminished or strangled.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
50 See Charles W. Smitherman III, The Future of Global Competition Governance: Lessons
from the Transatlantic, 19 Am U Intl L Rev 769, 796 (2004) ("Analysis by the Commission has
traditionally focused substantive review through the 'dominance' test, usually taken to ban
mergers creating a market share of forty percent or more.").
51 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed Reg at 41558-61 (cited in note 48) (explain-
ing the two types of harms that a merger or acquisition could cause).
52 Id at 41561-62.
53 See, for example, California v American Stores Co, 495 US 271 (1990) (permitting the
state of California to challenge an acquisition even after the FTC settled with the parties and
obtained a consent decree).
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consummation on the grounds that it now appears to have had anti-
competitive effects.!' For the mergers that were permitted and turn out
to be anticompetitive, the remedy must lie in either the single-firm
part of the law or the concerted action part, if any such harm can be
proven.
C. Exceptions
Many international efforts have foundered here. It is tempting
not to recognize any. This would mean, for example, that there would
be no exception for state action from a subordinate unit of govern-
ment," no exception for authorized cartels,6 and no exception for lob-
bying. 7 But such an absolutist approach is not desirable, at least with
respect to what we would call Noerr-Pennington activity." If firms can
persuade their governments to pass anticompetitive laws or regula-
tions, that is their prerogative in a democratic society. And if such laws
exist, they inevitably will modify the basic competition prohibitions.
Perhaps the best way to protect competition is to adopt a "clear
statement" rule for this kind of legislation: 9 no (new) law will be
deemed impliedly to repeal the competition code, and only a clear
statement indicating intent to displace competition will suffice. Laws
of lower governmental units, however, even if they are states in the
United States, or provinces in Canada, or cantons in Switzerland,
should not suffice. Parker v Brown can be jettisoned for international
transactions in the interest of global competitive harmony. The draft-
ers should also eliminate the ability of trade authorities to structure
world markets in a way that mimics cartel behavior, with price under-
takings that substitute for antidumping remedies, or some modern
equivalent of the old voluntary restraint agreements.
54 This is known as the "time of the suit" doctrine, which was endorsed by the Supreme
Court in United States v E.. DuPont de Nemours & Co, 353 US 586, 607 (1957) (evaluating a
1949 challenge to DuPont's 1917-1919 acquisition of a 23 percent interest in General Motors in
light of competitive conditions at the time of the suit).
55 See United States Postal Service v Flamingo Industries, 540 US 736 (2004) (holding that
the Postal Service, as part of the U.S. government, is not subject to antitrust liability).
56 See id at 747 (noting the Postal Service's "state-conferred monopoly on mail delivery").
57 See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 US 127, 135
(1961) ("[N]o violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence
the passage or enforcement of laws."); United Mine Workers of America v Pennington, 381 US
657, 670 (1965) ("Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public
officials regardless of intent or purpose.").
58 See Noerr, 365 US 127; Pennington, 381 US 657.
59 See, for example, Dellmuth v Muth, 491 US 223 (1989) (holding that Congress may abro-
gate state immunity only by making its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute).
60 317 US 341 (1943) (holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to state actions).
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D. Procedural Rules
Finally, there is the all-important topic of procedure. It is well
known that the United States is the only country with an exquisitely
well-developed private right of action in antitrust cases. It is also the
case that no one has ever seriously complained about an overall lack
of enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. If the DOJ is not interested in a
case, the FTC might be. If neither one is, then a state attorney general
might do something, and if all else fails, there will almost certainly be a
private plaintiff with antitrust injury and standing to sue for any bona
fide antitrust problem. Recalling again that a significant amount of the
momentum behind the call for international antitrust rules came from
those who argued that international markets are distorted when anti-
trust is enforced strongly in certain markets and ignored in others, it
seems that ensuring that every country provides for private rights of
action is the simplest solution to the problem. If a U.S. firm thinks that
anticompetitive collective action is keeping it out of Country A, then
let it bring a lawsuit in the courts of Country A.
Although the United States has been committed to treble dam-
ages," at least in cartel cases where the complaint is of overcharges or
underpayments, it is fair to say that the rest of the world is nowhere
close to accepting this remedy. Perhaps this one note of practicality
should influence the agreement, and it ought to require only a private
right of action in which the successful plaintiff is guaranteed to re-
cover actual damages, prejudgment interest, and attorneys' fees. Treble
damages would continue to be available at any nation's option.
Other procedural details would also have to be addressed, includ-
ing topics like statutes of limitations, availability of injunctive relief,
private rights of action in merger cases, and the designation of a single
responsible agency in each signatory country for any discovery coor-
dination that might be needed. Indeed, this last point is one that
should not be overlooked, because effective prosecution of interna-
tional cartels must often take place with close cooperation among the
agencies of several countries. In keeping with the goals of the Interna-
tional Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, such informa-
tion sharing should be authorized and encouraged in the code, subject
of course to strict protections for the collection and handling of confi-
dential business information.
61 15 USC § 15 (2000) (providing for treble damages in private antitrust suits).
62 15 USC § 6201 et seq (2000) (facilitating obtaining foreign antitrust evidence).
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CONCLUSION
So there we have it: an international antitrust code to be adminis-
tered by the national authorities and courts of each signatory country
that strips down competition law to its bare essentials and commits
each country to a sound, economically-based set of rules. The only
remaining question is whether any international body ought to have
supervisory control over the individual national decisions. My answer
would be no, for all the reasons why I have opposed the creation of a
WTO antitrust code. There is no such body for the Warsaw Conven-
tion, or for the CISG, or for the New York Convention, or for myriad
other successful multilateral conventions. Conflicts do arise from time
to time, of course, but it seems unlikely that they will be resolved any
more effectively under an institution's umbrella than they already are
on an ad hoc basis. After some initial tension over the GE-Honeywell
merger, which was blocked by the EU after it was permitted in the
United States,u feathers settled again and everyone learned from the
disagreements. There is simply not enough evidence of intractable
problems to justify the creation of dispute resolution machinery of
this kind. If and when such evidence arises, this point can be revisited.
In the final analysis, one must still wonder whether the effort it
would take to achieve international consensus on all these points
would be worth it. The alternative would be to urge countries to in-
corporate in their domestic laws the most important principles and to
live with the differences that remain. Global convergence on competi-
tion law has come a long way since the years after the Second World
War when the United States appeared to be the only country with a
vigorous antitrust culture. That process is likely to continue, even if
not at the pace some would prefer. The purpose of this Essay is to
suggest which rules would be worth working for, if the world became
serious about pursuing a global competition agenda. Even granting
the consensus that exists at the level of broad principle, the details
would indeed be devilish.
63 See Anita Raghavan and Bob Davis, Uncle Sam and Mr. Monti: Tale of Two Trustbusters,
Wall St J All (June 15, 2001) (describing the differing views among antitrust authorities in the
U.S. and the EU of the GE-Honeywell merger).
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